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AGENDA ITEM 3 
RESOLVING THE POLITIAL CRISIS (POWER SHARING) 
 
Report on Status of Implementation 
January 2009 
 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
1. This report focuses on the status of implementation of Agenda Item 3 on power sharing, 
which the National Accord underlined as important in resolving the political crisis. Data 
on which this report is based was collected using a mix of methods. The baseline survey 
shows opinions and perceptions about power sharing. The report covers the period 
between March 2008 and January 2009. Our indicators for tracking progress on this 
agenda item include the following: 
a) Distribution of public sector positions. 
b) Political cohesion in the coalition. 
c) Coherence in decision making. 
d) Conflict management within the coalition government. 
e) Public satisfaction with the coalition government. 
2. A point to note in this report is that power-sharing was not an end in itself; it was a means 
to initiating a process that would lead to various reforms, including those that would 
address the fundamental causes of the crisis. The Long-Standing issues are covered under 
Agenda Item 4. The following are highlights of the findings on power sharing. 
3. Internal conflict: Conflict between the parties that make up the coalition as well as within 
the parties themselves were a feature of the coalition throughout the last quarter of 2008 
and the beginning of January 2009. In particular, there have been debates on the powers 
of the Office of the Prime Minister, vis-à-vis the Office of the Vice President and the 
Office of the Head of Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet. Conflict between the 
Office of the Prime Minister and the Office of the Head of Civil Service has been most 
visible.  
4. Some argue that the powers of the Head of Civil Service are in conflict with those of the 
Prime Minister. ODM has consistently complained that it has no influence in Government 
and that the Head of Civil Service has been undermining the Prime Minister. On its part, 
PNU has argued that the position of the Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, is 
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entrenched in the present Constitution and that the Head of Civil Service (the PS) is 
performing his duties as required by the law. 
5. The focus on the administrative powers and political hierarchy of these institutions 
underscores the need to fast-track the constitutional review process. In the long-term, only 
a new constitution will make the adjustments required to sustainably address the question 
of power balance between these institutions. In the short-term, a ‘political’ solution needs 
to be found that will overcome the conflict (or at least remove it from the public eye 
where it is damaging the credibility of the Coalition Government). 
6. Distribution of public sector positions: The parties to the National Accord seem to 
interpret the principles of the National Accord from different perspectives. Some argue 
that power is disproportionately distributed in favour of PNU and that ODM has no 
influence within Government. Because of this, there is a strong perception that PNU has a 
greater share of public positions and that the party does not want to share power. How 
power should be shared between the coalition partners – and the type of public positions 
to be shared – is an issue that can be effectively settled through constitutional reforms. 
Administrative solutions will deepen the problem. Fast tracking and concluding the 
constitutional review is an urgent matter. 
7. Political Cohesion:  Political cohesion remains largely unpredictable both between and 
within the Coalition partners. Although internal intrigues are a characteristic of coalitions 
the world over, the absence of cohesion within Kenya’s coalition is exacerbated by 
diverse interests within individual political parties. To some members of the public, the 
Coalition is a ‘two-in-one-government’. 
8. Coherence in decision-making: The public perception of a ‘two-in-one-government’ is 
often accentuated by lack of coherence in decision-making. There are times when 
decisions are made but are received with hostility by a different group in the Coalition. 
And where there are failures, the parties engage in blame games. However, there are both 
cases of successful and failed decision-making in the Grand Coalition.  
9. Conflict Management within the Coalition: The coalition parties did not sign a coalition 
agreement. It is possible that conflict within the coalition would have been resolved with 
ease if such an agreement was in place. A new Permanent Committee comprising 
members from each party has been established to manage the affairs of the Coalition. 
While this is a positive step, it is important that a written framework/ agreement for 
managing the affairs of the Coalition is prepared and signed by the Partners. 
10. Satisfaction with Grand Coalition: The level of public satisfaction with the Grand 
Coalition is waning. The Government is perceived to lack commitment to major political 
reforms and to effective public service delivery. There is a need to restore public 







11. The Coalition Government is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. The parties to 
the National Accord had agreed that power sharing was critical to resolving the 
fundamental causes of the crisis the country was facing. For this reason, the Coalition 
partners’ attention should be on broad and comprehensive reforms, including the 
constitutional review process itself. The public is beginning to question whether partners 
in the Coalition Government act in the public interest. There is a growing perception that 
this is a two in one government. The reform process needs to be prioritised through the 
collective energy of the political leadership, gaining a momentum that will make delivery 
unstoppable. 
12. Conflicts within the coalition have meant lack of collective vision on reforms and that 
commitment to reforms is not internalised. This has given room for anti-reform and non-
reform forces at all levels to operate. This has also resulted in more divisions within the 
coalition. It is important for the two principles to mobilise support for reforms within 
parliament during parliamentary debates. 
13. Internal conflicts both within the Coalition and in the parties that make up the Coalition, 
have the potential of deflecting attention away from reforms to short-term interests. 
Insulating the constitutional review process – and other institutional reforms – from the 
intricacies of party politics is critical. A coalition agreement should be developed and 





14. This report reviews the extent to which power sharing has been achieved or is being 
achieved within the Grand Coalition. Selected indicators for reporting on power sharing 
include percentage distribution of public sector positions; level of political cohesion; level 
of coherence in decision-making; conflict management within the Grand Coalition and 
level of satisfaction with the Coalition Government. 
15. The report is based on data collected and analysed from secondary sources as well as 
interviews with key informants. The report has also integrated findings from the national 
baseline survey conducted in December 2008 to establish the benchmarks for monitoring 
the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreement. 
16. We begin by noting that it is almost a year since President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of 
National Unity (PNU) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) signed the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement on 
February 28, 2008. The National Accord recognised that the crisis revolved around issues 
of power and the functioning of state institutions. The Constitution had to be amended to 
provide for a coalition government.  
17. In this report, we discuss progress in power sharing and the challenges the partners have 
been experiencing. We note nonetheless that the parties have tended to interpret the 
National Accord on the basis of their own perspectives and individual interests. This has 
resulted in tensions within the Coalition to the extent that the momentum for the main 
agenda for the Grand Coalition – implementing comprehensive reforms – is reducing. 
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Distribution of power and sharing of public sector positions 
18. We have already pointed out that sharing political power was crucial for ending the 
political crisis. Thus, power sharing was not an end in itself. It was meant to facilitate the 
initiation of broad-based reforms.  
19. The National Accord devolved some executive powers to the new office of the Prime 
Minister. These powers include the authority to appoint half of the Cabinet, and to 
coordinate and supervise the functions of the Government, including those of ministries. 
We note that amendments to the Constitution (to provide for this structure of power) were 
made to address the political crisis at that moment. Therefore, the relationship of the new 
office to the existing institutions such as the Office of the Vice President and the Office of 
the Head of the Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet may not have received due 
attention and analysis.   
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20. Conflicts emanating from this relationship have negatively impacted on public 
perceptions of power sharing within the Coalition. Notably, in the baseline survey, only 
44% of Kenyans think that there is equal power sharing between the two Coalition 
partners. Although 46% are satisfied with the way power is shared, 51% are dissatisfied. 
21. There are several challenges facing ‘effective power sharing’ at this level. Some of the 
analysts that we have interviewed argue that despite the constitutional amendment, the 
President still retained more executive power and that it is difficult to tell the scope of 
powers vested in the Prime Minister.
1
 Also, the National Accord created the Office of the 
Prime Minister without redefining the role or scope of powers of other existing 
institutions such as the Office the Vice-President and the Head of Civil Service. Those of 
this view point out that the National Accord did not translate the full spirit of the Accord 
into the letter of the law.
2
 Other challenges include power struggles between the Office of 
the Prime Minister and Office of the Vice President
3
 and the Office of the Head of Public 
Service;
4
 and the lack of trust and good faith between political parties to work together.
5
 
22. What emerges here is that the distribution and exercise of executive power between the 
two parties has assumed a pattern that does not carry the spirit of the National Accord 
forward. The weaknesses in the National Accord have sometimes been exploited to cause 
tensions within the Grand Coalition. Many Kenyans believed in the spirit of the National 
Accord and are of the view that it is the Accord that has promoted calm and reduced 
violence. 
23. While all coalitions the world over experience similar problems, it is our view that a new 
constitution will provide guidance on the future structure of government. It is important 
that failings of the coalition inform the structure of government to be adopted in any new 
constitution. However, short-term ‘process’ solutions are required to address this 
immediate threat to the Accord (and the credibility of the Coalition), pending review of 
the constitution. 
Sharing of public sector positions 
24. The National Accord underlined that ‘the composition of the coalition government shall 
at all times reflect the relative parliamentary strength of the respective parties and shall at 
all times take into account the principle of portfolio balance.’ There have been different 
interpretations of this provision. It should be noted that lack of consensus on the meaning 
of ‘portfolio balance’ has had its consequences in terms of public perceptions. Some of 
                                                
1 Interview with legal expert/analyst in Jan 2009. 
2 Ibid. 
3 The protocol wars between the two offices recently resurfaced during the debate on the proposed amendments to the 
Parliamentary Standing Orders. See Hansard Report on December 10, 2008. Available at:  
http://www.bunge.go.ke/downloads/Tenth%20Parl%201st%20Session/Hansard/10.12.08P.pdf 
4 ODM party has constantly observed that the Head of Public Service has been “interfering in and undermining” the Prime 
Minister’s office. In the past one month, there has been heated debate between the Coalition partners on whether or not to do 
away with the position of the Head of Public Service. The PNU has strongly defended Amb. Francis Muthaura’s position 
and work even as ODM continues to protest. 
5 The baseline survey shows that 40% of Kenyans think political parties failing to work together is a stumbling block to 
power sharing. 
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these issues can be settled effectively through a comprehensive review of the constitution. 
Administrative solutions will make these problems more complex and will lead to 
political conflicts between the partners. 
25. The baseline survey shows that 46% of Kenyans are satisfied with the way power is 
shared between the two parties while 51% are not. While 44% of Kenyans think power is 
shared equally between the two parties, about half (49%) do not think so. Of those who 
think that one group has more power, 89% of them think that PNU has more power than 
ODM. In all, 60% of the respondents think that some of the parties want more power. 
Perceptions of disproportionate distribution of political power in the coalition appear to 
be swaying public opinion. Negative perceptions on power sharing represent a threat to 
future political stability.  
26. The Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government anticipated that the formation 
of the Coalition Government will at all times take into consideration the principle of 
portfolio balance and partners’ relative parliamentary strength.
6
 In April 2008, a total of 
92 Cabinet ministers and assistant ministers was agreed upon between the Coalition 
partners and the positions shared equally at 50% each.
7
 Three Cabinet positions became 
vacant and were filled in January.
8
  Although it is unclear why the President and the 
Prime Minister took more than six months to do so, some observers read internal party 
politics among the two Coalition partners as being responsible for the delay.
9
 
27. The issue of portfolio balance in the distribution of Cabinet positions was critical at the 
time of the formation of the Grand Coalition. Since then, no more changes have been 
made in a bid to achieve portfolio balance at the Cabinet level. This could be an 
indication that the Coalition partners are satisfied with the situation thus far. One senior 
government official observes that some ministers who thought their ministries were less 
strategic (in terms of portfolio balance) have been able to transform them into equally 
significant ministries. Subsequently, this may mean that the weight of a portfolio depends 
on the zeal of the office holder.  
28. In terms of sharing high-level public sector positions (other than Cabinet), there have 
been recurring disagreements between Coalition partners as to whether the principle of 
portfolio balance applies or not. What has been observed over the past months is that 
consultations and consensus between the two principals on any appointments is crucial 
for allaying internal disagreements. For example, in October and November 2008, there 
were reports in the media that the coalition partners were unable to agree on the 
appointment of new ambassadors. ODM had claimed that it did not get its rightful share 
of public sector positions. On January 15, 2009, President Kibaki appointed about 10 
ambassadors following consultations with the Prime Minister. The names the two did not 
                                                
6 See Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government signed on February 28, 2008. 
7 See Office of the President, 2008. Presidential Circular No. 1/2008: Organisation of the Government. Issued on May 30, 
2008.  
8 ODM had two vacancies following the death of two of its members and PNU 1 following the resignation of one member. 
9 For instance, they see ODM as being captive to the Rift Valley ethnic bloc and it is unable to satisfy one bloc and leave out the other. 
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agree on were shelved for later discussions.
10
 This latter approach indeed reflects the 
spirit of the National Accord. 
29. Coalition governments are sometimes formed to create a national government by 
distributing public sector positions equitably to different ethnic groups in ethnically 
divided societies. Although this was not expressly provided for in the National Accord, a 
majority of Kenyans consider ethnicity as a pertinent factor in sharing election spoils. So 
far, only 37% of Kenyans say that there is equitable distribution of civil service jobs 
(ministries and parastatals) among various ethnic groups in Kenya compared to 47% who 
think that one ethnic group, the Kikuyu, has more.
11
  
30. Evidently, the meaning of power sharing under the National Accord has remained a 
subject of controversy in the course of implementation. There is a growing perception that 
one partner in the Coalition is not getting an equal share of power. It is also expected that 
any future conflict is likely to stem from the sharing of senior public sector positions as 
opposed to Cabinet positions. Ethnic sensitivity and equity in appointments is something 
that Kenyans need to see happening. 
Level of political cohesion 
31. Political cohesion is a good measure of predicting the stability and effectiveness of 
coalition governments. This is because such governments are brought together by a need 
to develop a common policy (bipartisan policy) to deal with a national crisis. Public 
interest, national unity and stability can override party differences. Political cohesion is 
thus critical especially in relation to policies that have a bipartisan base. It entails 
common policy positions on critical issues underlying the National Accord and high 
levels of cohesion at both intra-party and inter-party levels. 
32. The mandate of Kenya’s coalition government is very specific – spearheading reforms. 
Therefore and as suggested by one analyst, the coalition cannot be treated as an ordinary 
government. The conflicts witnessed within the Coalition Government, especially in the 
last quarter of 2008 have resulted in many people losing confidence in its ability to 
deliver reforms. For instance, only as few as 10% think the Coalition Government will 
deliver a new constitution. 
33. Responses are mixed on whether or not there has been political cohesion within the Grand 
Coalition. One observation is that political positions on policy issues have remained 
dynamic across the political divide. In the recent past, the most critical policy issues have 
included the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry on 
Post Election Violence (Waki Report) and those of the Independent Review Commission 
on the General Election Held in Kenya in December 2007 (the Kriegler Report); the 
establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission; constitutional 
reforms, among others.  




34. Between October and November 2008, it was almost certain that consensus would not be 
reached on some of these issues. There were rifts between and within Coalition partners. 
However, by early December 2008, there was already a shift that saw political 
convergence in supporting some of these critical policy issues.  
35. The political consensus can be attributed to three things. First, it was the political 
leadership provided by the two principals and the newfound cohesion within the Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) team.  The team has been critical in 
marshalling support for various legislations that would spearhead reforms to support the 
National Accord. Second, public opinion at the time was mostly against those opposed to 
reforms. Third, there was constant pressure from the international community and locally 
to implement the Waki Report’s recommendations.  
36. But there are also mixed signals on the level of political cohesion between the two 
partners. It has regularly been reported that the two principals are always in consultation 
on critical policy issues.  However, many were left wondering when the President signed 
into law the controversial Kenya Communication (Amendment) Bill, 2008, on December 
30, 2008 despite the Prime Minister’s public assertion that he hoped the Bill would not be 
assented to into law. This incident underscored the dynamics and the nature of the Grand 
Coalition. It is also clear that it is principally through the goodwill of the two leaders that 
the Coalition is kept on course. 
37. Within political parties, ODM has been the most affected by internal dissent in recent 
months. The Rift Valley region has not been particularly happy with the allocation of 
Cabinet positions, the handling of the Mau Forest issue and the Prime Minister’s position 
on the implementation of the Waki Report. As a result, in November 2008, some leaders 
in the region threatened to lead the Kalenjin out of ODM.  
38. We argue that ethnicity is the fulcrum around which conflicts of power within and 
between parties revolves. Failure to manage ethnic-based politics may have destabilising 
effects on all reform initiatives. If left unattended, ethnic-based interests will dilute 
reforms to short-term gains. 
39. The coalition government has declared 2009 as the year of reforms. This means that 
nurturing political cohesion will be important during this period. Due to the mixed 
political signals, almost 60% of Kenyans see the Grand Coalition as having a difficult 
time working together. This is not a positive finding in light of the reform agenda for 
2009 and the importance of positive public sentiment both in keeping the peace and 






Coherence in decision-making 
40. The level of decision-making on national policy issues in the recent past has been mixed.  
We have noted tensions between the Office of the Prime Minister and that of the Head of 
Public Service. Lack of coherence in the operations of the two offices has occasioned 
open conflict.
12
 These conflicts tend to create a perception of a two-in-one-government. 
This in itself also undermines conditions for political accountability, and it weakens 
mechanisms for good governance and accountable decision-making. 
Conflict management within the Coalition 
41. As it has already been demonstrated, points of conflicts within the Coalition have been 
many. The National Accord set out the principles of partnership in the Coalition 
Government, which included constant consultation and willingness to compromise. There 
was, however, no structure on how these would be achieved. The lack of a conflict 
resolution mechanism has seen the stability of the Coalition come under threat on several 
occasions. These conflicts are likely to deepen because there is no coalition agreement 
signed by the two parties. 
42. In May, 2008, it was reported that a joint team from all parties to the Coalition had 
prepared a draft proposal for the creation of a Panel, which would act as a dispute 
resolution mechanism for the Coalition.
13
 Although necessary for the management of the 
Coalition, the document was never signed by the concerned parties.
14
 However, on 
January 15, 2009, the Coalition partners established a Permanent Committee to manage 
the affairs of the Grand Coalition.
15
 Each Coalition Partner has 6 representatives in the 
committee. The shortfall of the committee is that it had no women – a shortcoming 
quickly righted by naming two women to it. Some members of the PNU coalition have 
dismissed the committee as non-starter because it is not representative enough.
16
  
43. The creation of the Permanent Committee is just one step towards stabilising the 
Coalition. It remains unknown how effective the team will be. It is important that a 
written framework for managing the Coalition is prepared and signed by the partners. 
There have been some positive comments on the contents of the initial draft prepared in 
May 2008, which need to be taken into account. In the absence of an agreement, the 
conflict will intensify and spill into the reform process. 
 
 
                                                
12 Two recent examples include appointment of a team of election officials to guide the transition from ECK to an interim 
body. The Prime Minister’s office observed that there were no consultations in doing so. Also, in October 2008, both offices 
showed a lack of co-ordination in addressing allegations of abuse of office in NSSF. 
13 Opiyo, D., 2008.New Rules to Govern Coalition Proposed. Daily Nation, 9 May. 
14 PNU blamed ODM for not signing the document while ODM claimed that the document was not adequate. See Namunane, B., 2009. Top 
Team to Mediate Coalition Wrangles. Daily Nation, 15 July. http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/515332/-/u1act3/-/index.html  
15 Ibíd. 
16Standard Team, 2009. Team Set Up to Manage Coalition Affairs. The Standard, January 15. See 
http://www.eastandard.net/InsidePage.php?id=1144004189&cid=4&  
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Level of satisfaction with the Coalition Government 
44. There is evidence that the level of satisfaction with the Coalition Government varies 
across board. As far as the Coalition partners themselves are concerned, ODM seems not 
to be completely happy with the relationship. On a number of occasions in the recent past, 
ODM leaders have spoken of their frustrations in the Grand Coalition and how it had 
slowed down the ODM agenda.
17
 The party has also raised concern over being treated as 
“junior partners” by their PNU counterparts. Interestingly, the PNU side rarely complains 
of similar issues. After reviewing its position within the Grand Coalition, ODM pushed 
for the formation of the Permanent Committee as one way of addressing its concerns 
within the Grand Coalition. 
45. But most important is how the Grand Coalition and its institutions are perceived to be 
functioning. Generally, approval ratings for most government institutions, including the 
President and the Prime Minister, were high when the coalition was formed. This is 
declining, however.
18
 The low scores are as a result of apparent laxity by the Coalition in 
attending to immediate public concerns such as inflation, unemployment, and food 
security, among others. In terms of service delivery, over 52% of Kenyans rate the 
services received from their MPs, local authorities and central government as poor. There 
seems to be a clear disconnect between what the public wants and what the leaders are 
seen to be focusing on.  
46. The manner in which the debate around the enactment of the Kenya Communication 
(Amendment) Act of 2008 was handled; the refusal by MPs to pay taxes on their 
allowances; the recent teachers’ strike; serious allegations of high-level corruption in the 
maize and oil sectors; and the debate surrounding the powers of the Prime Minister versus 
those of the Head of Public Service, are some of the issues that create the perception of a 
lack of commitment by the Grand Coalition to reforms and the immediate needs of 
Kenyans. 
47. There is a need to restore confidence and faith in the Grand Coalition. The Grand 
Coalition is seen as having forgotten that it is a government in transition with a specific 
mandate of undertaking reforms. One analyst has suggested that the Coalition partners 
have become comfortable with their positions in government and will do anything to hold 
the Coalition together until 2012 - not in the public interest, but to serve political self-
interest. It is therefore upon the Coalition partners and other external actors to ensure that 




                                                
17 Ongiri, I., 2008. The Standard, December 19.  
18 From the baseline survey the Prime Minister Odinga scores 59%, President Kibaki 43%, Cabinet 28%, Parliament 24% 




48. It is almost a year since President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga signed the 
agreement on principles of partnership of the coalition government. This agreement 
provided for power sharing between the parties. The new structure of government may 
not be a perfect model but it helped solve the political crisis at the time.  
49. The National Accord is also significant as it provided a base to initiate comprehensive 
reforms. This objective cannot be realised if there is no effective power sharing between 
the Coalition partners. In a number of instances, the National Accord has been open to 
different interpretations, which serve short-term political interests. This has been a source 
of threat to the stability of the Coalition Government and even to reforms. It is however 
possible to use the flexibility within the National Accord to advance its spirit. 
50. Initiating reforms in all areas critical for stability and national unity should be prioritised. 
The nature of reforms suggested under the Accord cannot be implemented, however, in 
an environment where political competition is not guided by a national vision. This vision 
cannot develop where short-term individual and ethnic interests guide decisions on 
important national issues.  
51. To rekindle confidence in the Government and public institutions, KNDR may need to 
systematically and candidly debate the political challenges facing the coalition 
government and advise on legal and political solutions. An impartial third party arbiter 
may be important for this process. 
52. On the whole, the coalition government presents the best opportunity to initiate and 
complete comprehensive reforms due to the bipartisan policies in place. There may be 
challenges in terms of how different institutions work together but there are opportunities 
that simply must be exploited to move the country forward and away from the abyss into 
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Facilitate real power 
sharing to move the 
country forward by 
observing the 
principles of portfolio 
balance and relative to 
parliamentary strength. 
Percentage 







Position of Prime 
Minister (ODM) and 2 
deputies (ODM & PNU) 
established through a 
Constitutional 
amendment and the 
National Accord and 
reconciliation Act in 
March 2008. 
A total of 92 ministers and 
assistant ministers 
appointed in April 2008 on 
a 50:50 ratio 
 
Cabinet positions left 
vacant due to the death of (2 
ODM) ministers and the 
resignation of the Finance 
Minister (PNU) in June 
There are challenges in the exercise of the Prime Minister’s 
power due to apparent institutional conflict between the PM’s 
office and that of the Vice President and Head of Public 
Service. 
The interpretation and application of the principle of portfolio 
balance remains controversial with respect to high-level 
government appointments. Constitutional reform can 
effectively settle the controversies around power sharing. 
Complaints about a lack of effective consultation on high-level 





INDICATOR PROGRESS TOWARDS 
OUTPUT 
REMARKS 
2008 only filled in January 
2009. 
A number of permanent 
secretaries, heads of 
parastatals and ambassadors 
appointed. 
Level of political 
cohesion 
Levels of cohesion remain 
unpredictable. The divisive 
response to the Waki and 
Kriegler reports (launched 
in October and November 
2008) illustrate simmering 
levels of discord. 
However, by December 
2008 oppositionists 
retracted and supported the 
implementation of the 
reports – allowing 
important legislation to be 
adopted. 
Levels of intra- party 
cohesion have been very 
low especially within ODM. 
59% of Kenyans assess the 
Coalition as having a 
difficult time working 
together.  
Political cohesion is critical for achieving reforms. 
Mistrust among political parties, a lack of willingness to 
implement reforms, and ethnic divisions are some of the 
hindrances to political cohesion. 
The political leadership of the two principals, effective 
consultation, public and civil society pressure, and the 
diplomacy of the international community are instrumental in 
promoting cohesion on the reform agenda.  
Destabilising factors such as ethnic tension and mistrust need 
to be managed deftly to build a shared reform momentum. 
% of public who 
perceive real power 
as being shared 
(locally and 
44% of Kenyans think 
power is shared equally 
between ODM and PNU 
while 49% think power is 
Public perception on power sharing between the Coalition 
partners has diminished drastically since the signing of the 
Accord.  




INDICATOR PROGRESS TOWARDS 
OUTPUT 
REMARKS 
nationally). not equally shared. 81% of 
the 49% think PNU enjoys 
more power. 
34% of Kenyans also think 
that the coalition partners 
are not committed to 
sharing power equally. 
the lack of cohesion within the coalition. 
Level of public 
satisfaction in the 
functioning of the 
Grand Coalition. 
Approval ratings for most 
coalition institutions has 
dwindled almost a year 
down the line. While 
surveys in mid-2008 gave 
approval rating of about 
60%, rating for many 
institutions in the Coalition, 
the rating was below 50% 
in December 2008. 
The low approval rating is a result of the perceived lack of 
commitment by the Grand Coalition to meet the immediate 
needs of Kenyans. The coalition needs to inspire public 
confidence on delivery. 
Level of public 
satisfaction in the 
make up of public 
sector positions. 
Ethnicity remains an issue 
in the demand for public 
sector positions. 
Only 37% of Kenyans 
perceive that there is 
equitable distribution of 
civil service jobs (ministries 
and parastatals). 
47% think that one ethnic 
group dominates. 
Balancing ethnic identity cannot be ignored in high-level 




Partners commit to 
govern together and 
push through a reform 
agenda for the benefit 
of all Kenyans. 
Levels of coherence 
in decision-making. 
Institutions for harmonised 
decision-making such as 
Cabinet sub-committees are 
in place. 
There are recurrent power 
Redefine the role of the PM and the Head of Public Service to 
avoid the apparent conflicts which are illustrative of 
incoherence and undermine public confidence. 
Coalition partners should adopt a structured approach to 




INDICATOR PROGRESS TOWARDS 
OUTPUT 
REMARKS 
struggles between the 
Office of the Prime Minister 
and Head of Public Service 
as to who does what, when. 
mechanism in all structures is critical 




Over 50% of Kenyans rate 
service delivery by central 
government, local 
government and MPs as 
poor.  
The Grand Coalition is in danger of losing the confidence of 
Kenyans who appear to doubt that the Coalition partners are acting 







For 10 months after 
formation -- no structured 
conflict resolution 
mechanism in place. The 
draft conflict management 
agreement framework 
prepared by May 2008 has 
not been signed. 
A Permanent Committee to 
manage the affairs of the 
Grand Coalition set up on 
Jan 15, 2009. 
KNDR team should finalise the conflict management 
agreement and signature by partners. 
The Permanent Committee perceived by some as not 
representative and as not being gender sensitive.  
 
